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Abstract— Recent and sudden rise in the popularity of drones or 
UAVs (Unmanned Air Vehicles) can be attributed to the 
reduction in weight of electronic components and the relative 
ease by which the drones can be operated. Their potential 
applications range from simple leisure and recreational purposes 
to photography, transport, surveying, security, the list goes on. 
With this demand and subsequent availability, there has also 
been a rise in drones used in crimes. This creates a need for 
forensic analysis into these devices, which often use custom 
electronic flight systems for which appropriate forensic tools 
have not been developed. This paper covers the use and 
development of open source tools to aid forensic analyses of two 
popular drones - the DJI Phantom 3 Professional and AR Drone 
2 with the aim of reconstructing the actions taken by these 
drones, identification of owners or operators, and extraction of 
data from associated mobile devices. While different UAV 
systems can vary in their operations owing to their capabilities, 
some generic methods will be used in analyses and extractions of 
the data and then results will be compared between models. 
Keywords—digital forensics; drone forensics; Linux, DJI 
Phantom; AR Drone 2.0; open source tools.  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Reports of drone-related incidents in the UK rose by 352% 
between 2014 and 2015 [1]. The growing availability and 
popularity of such devices means drone crime is an 
inevitability, and is likely only going to increase in the future. 
The wide potential applications of a drone means there is no 
one type of crime being committed, however the current 
climate is dominated by the transport of contraband. 
Smuggling offences committed both in domestic and 
international territories have demonstrated that drones are a 
capable and efficient delivery method, whatever the cargo. In 
the UK, drones are being used to smuggle weapons, phones 
and drugs into prisons, items which all have highly inflated 
value [2]. Worldwide, drones are being used to bypass 
borders, such as the United States/Mexico border where 
drones have been recovered carrying cargos of marijuana, 
heroin and methamphetamine as well as small weapons [3]. 
As well as smuggling, camera equipment that is commonly 
mounted to UAVs raises a host of privacy concerns. In most 
cases cameras are implemented either as static recording 
devices, or for live streaming (sometimes known as vision). 
Many different areas of airspace in the UK are designated no-
fly zones [4] because they are considered “sensitive areas” – 
these include sites such as airports, military bases and power 
stations. The ability of drones to capture pictures and videos of 
operations in these sites presents a significant security threat. 
As well as the security of infrastructure, individual security 
may also be compromised. Of the reported incidents 
mentioned earlier, 257 were simply concerns for public safety 
[1]. As well as simple privacy violations, drone-mounted 
cameras can also be used as an aid to traditional crime, such as 
burglary [5]. 
A modern drone is capable of carrying loads of up to 8kg 
[6] over vast distances, and is often equipped with an array of 
on-board sensors and other electronics that assist with flight 
and navigation, as well as camera equipment and digital 
storage. This makes drones a valuable source of forensic 
artefacts, creating the need for forensic research into the area. 
This paper will cover the forensic analysis of two popular 
drones; the DJI Phantom 3 Professional (Phantom) and the 
A.R. Drone 2.0 Power edition (A.R). Among commercially 
available drones, DJI has taken the largest market share of 
36%   [7] with its Phantom series setting the benchmark for 
professional drone use. A.R has a large range of drones 
available with many different features. While these drones are 
different in their operation owing to their capabilities, some 
generic methods of analysis can be applied to many different 
models. The methodology used in this paper will focus on 
these generic methods and compare the results between 
models. 
The remainder of the paper will be organised as follows: 
Section 2 will discuss existing research in relation to drone 
forensics, covering the drones featured in this paper. The 
methodology used during the analysis process will be 
discussed in Section 3, including acquisition and analysis of 
mobile, flight data and media artefacts for both platforms. 
Section 4 will cover the results of the analysis. Finally, 
Section 5 will conclude the paper and mention possible future 
work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Some important aspects of drone forensic analysis have been 
highlighted, including establishing flight data and establishing 
ownership [8]. These present a variety of challenges to the 
digital forensic investigator. Firstly, the interpretation of flight 
data is an essential part of drone forensics, and requires a 
skillset that is not normally possessed by a forensic analyst. 
Secondly, the presence of identifying artefacts such as names 
and addresses is not essential for the operation of the drone. 
This is a stark comparison to mobile forensics, where devices 
provide an abundance of personal information. In a crime 
scenario, there will be no inclination to provide such 
information and it is unlikely to be present. Artefacts have 
been successfully recovered from the DJI Phantom 2 Vision+, 
including flight data and recorded media - using mobile 
forensics to acquire data from the DJI GO controlling 
application, and using cyber security techniques to gain access 
to the internal storage of the UAV [9].  
Drones, like smartphones, are fully integrated digital 
systems with their own storage, processing and network 
capabilities and must be treated as such.  Analysis of storage 
media is where traditional digital forensic techniques become 
useful. The recorded media of the Phantom 2 Vision+ was 
found to possess Exchangeable Image Format (EXIF) 
metadata including GPS (Global Positioning System) 
information [9]. In the absence of flight logs, co-ordinates 
extracted from EXIF data can be used to recreate a flight. 
Cyber security techniques are often used to gain access to data 
and components where chip-off analysis is not available. 
Analysis of the Phantom 3 Standard edition revealed that an 
IPv4 network is created between the components of the UAV 
system including the drone, controller, on-board camera and 
smartphone. De-compilation of the DJI GO application 
revealed the Service Set Identifier (SSID) and password 
required to gain access to this network [10]. 
A.R drones use an embedded Linux operating system that 
governs the flight, camera and network interfaces. The drone 
provides an unsecured (by default) wireless access point. Once 
connected, root access to the operating system is granted via 
an anonymous telnet port. Root access presents a number of 
options for acquisition, including imaging internal storage 
partitions and logical-level copying [8]. While methods to 
analyse specific models of drones have been successful, this 
paper will focus on some generic methods that can be applied 
to both the DJI Phantom 3 Professional and the A.R. Drone 
2.0 Power edition.  
III. METHODOLOGY 
This paper focusses on two drones and one mobile platform, 
as shown in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. The Phantom 3 
Professional is a high capability commercial drone capable of 
traveling long distances and while the A.R Drone is more 
affordable, it still is capable of hovering and capturing 
imagery which gives it the potential of committing crime. 
TABLE I.  DRONES 
Name 
Specifications 
Price  Weight Camera Resolution Range 
DJI Phantom 
3 Professional 
£699.99 1280g 
4K (12 
Megapixels) 
5Km 
A.R Drone 
2.0 
£299.99 
380g / 
420g 
720p (0.9 
Megapixels) 
50m 
TABLE II.  ANDROID MOBILE PLATFORM 
 
To generate the required data for acquisition and analysis, 
a scenario was created on the devices by simulating the use of 
the drones in a crime. A suitable remote area with some high 
story buildings and open space was chosen to test the 
capabilities of the drones. Four waypoints over about a 150m 
radius were established. Once data was collected, the drones 
and the mobile platform were analysed in a digital forensics 
lab. Because of the multi-platform nature of UAV systems, no 
one forensics toolkit was suitable for analysing acquired data. 
For this reason, open source and custom tools were used 
throughout the acquisition and analysis process. These provide 
some significant advantages over commercial toolkits such as 
the ability to be tested by the open source community, meeting 
what are known as the “daubert” guidelines for the 
admissibility of evidence provided by expert witnesses [11]. 
Furthermore, custom tools created by the forensic investigator 
to perform a specific job are highly adaptable and, where 
successful, can be used again in other cases involving similar 
technology.  A forensic workstation running Kali, a 
distribution of Linux with several forensics and cybersecurity 
tools was used as well as a workstation running Windows, as 
listed in Table 3.  
TABLE III.  FORENSIC WORKSTATIONS 
Name 
Specifications 
Operating System 
Toshiba Sattelite L450D Kali Linux Rolling Update 
Fujitsu LB A512  NG Core I3 Windows 10 
 
The analysis later performed was divided into three 
categories; Mobile forensics, flight data and media. As 
modern drones are controlled through an application running 
on a mobile platform, the forensic analysis of these 
applications is paramount when analysing drone systems. 
Flight data is used to recreate the actions of a drone during 
flight, which is especially important when the drone has been 
used in smuggling or other flight-related crime. Finally, the 
media captured by the drone has forensic value in not only 
tracing the drone to its location during flight but also in cases 
of invasion of privacy.  
A. Mobile Forensics 
Mobile forensics covered in this paper relate to artefacts 
recovered from the DJI GO and A.R Freeflight applications 
installed on the mobile platform using mobile forensics 
techniques. An open-source operating system, CyanogenMod 
[12] provide rooting, which is necessary to access portions of 
internal storage that are protected by the operating system’s 
security [13]. The chosen operating system was used because 
the root access was granted natively, rather than needing to 
install third-party rooting software, which is a forensically 
sound option when methods such as chip-off analysis are not 
available. Although CyanogenMod differs in the features it 
provides to users compared to stock operating systems, the 
methods used to acquire data from the mobile platform are 
generic and can be applied to all Android systems [13]. Once 
Name 
Specifications 
Model 
Number 
Android 
Version 
CyanogenM
od Version 
Installed 
Applications 
Motarola 
Moto G 3rd 
Generation 
MotoG3 5.1.1  
 
12.1 
DJI GO v3.1.4 , 
A.R Freeflight v 
2.4.15 
the test platform was connected to the forensic workstation, 
root terminal access was granted using Android Debug Bridge 
(ADB) [14]. The “userdata” partition was identified by 
running the command “ls /dev/block/bootdevice/by-name” as 
being “mmcblk0p42”, as shown in Figure 1. A forensic image 
of this partition was then created using the “dd” Linux utility, 
and stored on a removable storage card formatted in the 
“ExFAT” (Extended FAT) filesystem. This was then copied to 
the forensic workstation for analysis.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Listing of mounted partitions on Android Platform 
B. Flight Data 
Flight data was collected via various sensors present on the 
UAV systems. Some key data of interest were GPS readings, 
altitude, speed, acceleration and battery levels. Analyses of 
these data can reveal the actions taken by the drone and can be 
used to re-construct flights. Flight data was stored on either 
the UAV internal storage or the mobile application, sometimes 
with copies on both. Recovery of data from the UAV internal 
storage required interfacing with access routes provided by the 
UAV platforms. 
1) DJI Phantom 3 Professional 
The DJI Phantom’s internal storage exists in the form of a 
micro SD card semi-permanently mounted to the main board 
of the UAV [14]. While chip-off forensics through removing 
this card would be the most forensically sound option of data 
acquisition, this was not chosen as it would impair the 
functionality of the drone. Instead, the UAV was placed in 
“flight data” mode through the DJI GO application, which 
makes the card accessible through the UAV’s micro USB port. 
The UAV was connected to the forensic workstation and an 
image of the internal storage was created. As the DJI 
Phantom’s system stores flight data in a proprietary format 
[15], it is necessary to use a tool for analysis. Many online 
services offer interpretation of DJI flight data, but uploading 
files to an externally hosted server is not appropriate for 
forensic investigation purposes. For this reason, an open 
source tool, “CsvView” [16] was installed on a forensic 
workstation running Windows and connected to the internet. 
Established with a google API key, the tool is able to 
download imagery from the Google Maps service. 
2) A.R Drone 2.0 
Unlike the DJI Phantom, the A.R drone does not have any 
hardware ports that allow access to the internal storage, which 
presents as a flash chip permanently mounted to the main 
board of the UAV. With chip-off analysis being unavailable in 
this case, the UAV was connected to the forensic workstation 
through Wi-Fi, which is a method used by both digital 
forensics and cyber security researchers to acquire data and 
investigate the drone [8]. When switched on, the UAV 
becomes a Wi-Fi hotspot with no form of authentication. 
Acquisition using this method will invariably change data on 
the device, so all actions were performed in accordance with 
the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) guidelines 
for handling digital evidence, specifically principles 2 and 3. 
Once connected, the forensic workstation’s Address 
Resolution Protocol (ARP) was queried, revealing the UAV 
has a local address of “192.168.1.1”. Running “nmap” [17] 
against the UAV revealed a telnet port, and root access was 
gained. Because of complications relating to the UAV’s 
Unsorted Block Image file system (UBIFS), logical level 
copying over the network was favoured over physical 
imaging.  
C. Media 
In the case of both the DJI Phantom 3 and the A.R Drone, 
media, including photos and videos taken by the UAV’s on-
board cameras, was stored on a removable storage. In the case 
of the DJI Phantom, this was a micro SD card slot on the main 
body of the UAV, which came pre-installed with a 16GB card. 
For the A.R Drone, a standard USB port was present next to 
the battery inside the hull of the UAV, which a flash drive was 
connected to. Both of these removable storage media were 
connected to the forensic workstation and images were 
created. While the media itself was examined using standard 
image viewing software present on the forensic workstation 
for consistency, a third party open-source tool, “exiftool” [18], 
was used to analyse the metadata of media files. This 
command-line tool presented the data in a raw, detailed format 
and the formatted output was easily manipulated using scripts.  
IV. RESULTS 
The results cover the key findings from the analysis described 
in the previous section. The results are presented with regards 
to the three categories of artefacts; mobile data, flight data and 
media.  
A. Mobile Forensics 
The mobile applications for each drone platform contained a 
wealth of artefacts. These not only include identifying 
artefacts such as account names or e-mail addresses but also 
flight data and media, making correlation between the UAV 
and mobile application possible through comparing artefacts. 
1) DJI Phantom 3 Professional 
A number of useful directories were located within the 
“media/0/DJI” directory on the “userdata” partition. A list of 
these with descriptions is shown in Table 4. The serial number 
for the UAV can be extracted from the contents of the DJI GO 
application and used to track the specific device used in flight. 
The data reveals information about the UAV’s internal system 
operations such as updates and errors. A log is also kept of 
times when the UAV encountered a no fly zone (NFZ) during 
flight. Media is present as copies of videos captured during 
flight are locally stored by the application. Flight data files 
with the “.txt” extension were extracted from the 
“FlightRecord” directory. The contents of these files will be 
discussed in the next section in comparison with the flight data 
extracted from the internal storage. These files possessed a 
number of useful metadata artefacts, which was viewed using 
the “CsvView” application [16]. One of the artefacts was the 
serial number which matched that of the UAV, meaning the 
UAV is traceable in the event of capturing artefacts from a 
mobile platform. 
TABLE IV.  USEFUL DIRECTORIES FROM DJI GO APPLICATION 
Path  Type Description 
/media/0/DJI/dji
.pilot/LOG/CA
CHE 
Flight Data 
Contains a number of logs relating 
to drone activity 
/media/0/DJI/dji
.pilot/LOG/CA
CHE/NFZ 
Flight Data 
This is a log of activity relating to 
the DJI’s built-in no fly zone 
function, and contains information 
such as GPS location.  
/media/0/DJI/dji
.pilot/LOG/ERR
OR_POP_LOG 
Flight Data 
An error log from the UAV. 
/media/0/DJI/dji
.pilot/DJI_REC
ORD 
Media 
A number of vide stored with the 
“mp4” file extension. For each 
video file, there is also a 
corresponding text file, which 
contains GPS data, manufacturing 
information and capture dates. 
/media/0/DJI/dji
.pilot/FlightRec
ord 
Identifying 
Artefacts 
Flight data relating to a number of 
flights. A string search of these 
files revealed the presence of the 
“cccu phantom” string, which was 
the name assigned to the UAV 
during setup, as well as the UAV 
serial number. 
/media/0/DJI/dji
.pilot/CACHE_I
MAGE 
Media 
Thumbnails of various images and 
videos taken during flight. 
 
2) A.R Drone 2.0  
The “userdata/data/com.parrot.freeflight” directory contained 
several “.xml” files, with names in the format of “<MAC 
Address of mobile platform>_<Timestamp>”. These appear to 
correlate with sessions of activity on the UAV. Each file 
contains a number of flight and application session records, 
with each XML (Extendable Markup Language) block being 
named accordingly. The “FLIGHT_DRONE_SERIAL” tag 
displays a matching serial number to the one extracted from 
the UAV, providing the same traceability as mentioned in the 
previous section. Another XML file, located in 
“userdata/com.parrot.freeflight/shared_prefs/Preferences.xml” 
held a number of important artefacts, including the GPS co-
ordinates of the last flight, the email address of the google 
account used to download the application, and when the 
application was last opened. The A.R Freeflight application 
has a media storage location in the platform’s 
“userdata/media/0/DCIM” (Digital Camera IMage) directory, 
which contains all the media captured by the UAV’s cameras. 
EXIF data for these files varies, some containing GPS 
information which matches the operator location during the 
flight, and some only containing a few details such as the 
creation date. 
B. Flight Data 
Flight data was successfully recovered from both UAV 
platforms. In each case flight data was useful in re-
constructing the actions taken by the drone and the operator 
and included numerous details such as flight paths and outputs 
from the operating system of the UAV. Flight data can also be 
correlated with artefacts recovered from the mobile platform 
and removable storage. 
1) DJI Phantom 3 Professional 
The files extracted from the internal storage of the DJI 
Phantom were analysed using the “CsvView” tool [16]. The 
DJI Phantom 3 Operating system begins recording flight data 
from the moment the UAV is switched on. This meant flights 
performed in the same session of drone activity were recorded 
in one file, “FLY012.DAT”. After processing using 
“CsvView”, which converts the file from a “.DAT” to a “.csv” 
format, the flights were visualised using the “GeoPlayer” 
function, which utilised the Google Maps API Key mentioned 
in part B of Section 3. This visualisation is shown in Figure 2, 
with each flight, waypoints 1-4 and the point of interest (POI) 
highlighted. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Visualised GPS data 
Other flight data extracted from the “.DAT” files included 
data streams from a host of on-board sensors. Plotting these 
streams against each other using “CsvView” allowed the 
drones actions to be deduced. Plotting the flight time (green), 
the barometric altitude (blue) and total battery voltage (purple) 
revealed three distinct periods of activity, which are 
interpreted as flights. The flight time increases linearly when 
the drone is in flight. This is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Flight time, altitude and battery levels 
The DJI Phantom logs provide an extensive amount of 
sensor data, including but not limited to acceleration, GPS 
health, and temperature. Collating these data streams can 
reveal a great deal about the actions taken by the UAV. The 
DJI GO flight logs mentioned in part A of Section 4 provided 
a similar set of streams, however there were less than the 
flight logs on the UAV and a lower resolution. The application 
logs also contained data available from the DJI GO 
application, such as whether the UAV was piloted in manual 
or automatic mode. A period of autonomous control state is 
highlighted in green in Figure 4. During flight 3 (Figure 2), the 
drone performed an automatic POI function which made it fly 
in a circle around a pre-determined point. Examining “distance 
from home” stream from the application flight log for this 
flight reveals the function generates a clearly visible sine wave 
when executed, as shown in Figure 4. The presence of sine 
wave directly indicates the use of the POI function. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Distance from home plotted against UAV flight state. 
2) A.R Drone 2.0 
The files copied from the internal storage of the A.R Drone 
2.0 were analysed using scripts and utilities on the forensic 
workstation. A number of files of interest were located, listed 
in Table 5. As the internal system is based on Linux, some 
common locations for forensic artefacts were analysed such as 
the “syslog.bin” file which contains threads relating to 
software processes running on the drone system and the 
“config.ini” file which contains serial numbers, version 
numbers and the name assigned to the UAV. Some files 
specific to the A.R Drone were also analysed, with the 
“sessions” and “profiles” configuration files which correlate 
with artefacts found using mobile forensics techniques.  
TABLE V.  LIST OF FILES ACQUIRED FROM A.R DRONE  
Path  Type Description 
/data/syslog.bin 
System log, 
containing details of 
various software and 
hardware events 
from the UAV’s 
internal operating 
system. 
Version information, 
configuration data, mount 
information, file creation 
logs 
/data/config.ini 
Configuration file 
for the UAV.  
Drone serial number, 
software version, drone 
name, access point SSID 
/data/emergency
.bin 
Unidentified binary 
file. Further work 
should identify the 
importance of this 
file and it’s 
cybersecurity 
implications. 
n/a 
/data/custom.co
nfigs/sessions/ 
Directory containing 
several files named 
“config.xxxxxxxx.in
i”   
GPS data. The UAV does 
not have a GPS sensor 
installed so it likely 
originated from the A.R 
Freeflight application.  
/data/custom.confi
gs/profiles/  
Directory containing 
a file named 
“config.xxxxxxxx.in
i”. 
Contains a footprint from 
the controlling application 
with name of the mobile 
platform, 
“Mororola_MotoG3” and 
a serial number – 
“PS721003AJ4K103341”. 
The “data/syslog.bin” was analysed using command line 
tools. Separate processes running on the A.R Drone leave 
named artefacts in the system log, and filtering these artefacts 
returned threads of activity. All threads containing the string 
“UsbKey” related to the removable storage device of the A.R 
Drone 2.0. Further filtering for the “Serial” string returned a 
history of the USB keys attached to the A.R Drone, as shown 
in Figure 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5. USB key serial number history 
Filtering the system log for all “UsbKeyWriter” outputs 
gave a history of all files created on the removable storage, 
with system times. Filtering for the “Video” outputs gives a 
log of the use of both the UAV’s internal cameras, which 
video codec is being used and other details including 
resolution. Examination of the “syslog.bin” file give a 
comprehensive overview of actions carried out by the UAV’s 
operating system. Values found also reflected values in the 
“config.ini” files listed in Table 5. Future work should identify 
whether modification of the “config.ini” files would change 
data in the system log, for anti-forensics purposes. 
C. Media 
To examine the EXIF data from the media captured by the 
drone, the command line “exiftool” [18] was used, as 
mentioned in part C of Section 3.  
1) DJI Phantom 3 Professional 
“Exiftool” was run against the DCIM/100MEDIA directory of 
the DJI Phantom’s removable storage media. On initial 
inspection, GPS co-ordinates are stored under a “GPS 
Position” EXIF tag. To automate the process of extracting the 
GPS co-ordinates and create a timestamped GPS media log, a 
simple script was created, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Script to retrieve GPS data from media EXIF information 
The script formats the GPS data to 6 decimal places. The 
output is then filtered to only contain the GPS Position and 
Create Date, which denotes when the picture or video was 
taken. The output of this script is seen in Figure 7. The output 
of this script could be used to create a visual map of all the 
photos taken during flight. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Output of GPS extractor script 
 
2) A.R Drone 2.0  
While photos taken by the A.R are actually stored by the A.R 
Freeflight application, any videos taken are stored on the 
removable storage. Examination of the video files using 
“exiftool” revealed a number of artefacts, including creation 
time and the device name “Parrot AR.Drone”. The 
“ARDroneTelemetry” tag was extracted from one of the 
videos using the “-b” option. This returned a set of floating 
point numbers and integers, with no labels or column headers. 
Using heuristics based on knowledge of the drone system and 
flight data, it was deduced that the first of the floating points 
was a timestamp, as it increased in regular increments. Also 
deduced was that the last floating point was the altitude of the 
UAV during flight, as the values steadily changed, and 
matched the approximate value of the flight. The telemetry 
data was dumped to a file for analysis with the command 
“exiftool –b –ARDroneTelemetry media20170401_150213/vi 
deo_20170401_150249.mp4 > ~/drones/parrot/gnuplot/teleme 
try”. A bash script was created to convert the data to a comma-
separated value file, which could then be visualised using the 
“gnuplot” [19] tool for Linux. The altitude was plotted over 
the period of the whole video, as seen in Figure 8.  
 
Fig. 8. Altitude measurements for the duration of an extracted video file 
V. CONCLUSION 
Analysis of data acquired from both drone platforms revealed 
operational differences between the DJI Phantom 3 
Professional and the A.R Drone 2.0. However, a number of 
common methods were demonstrated to recover data from 
these multi-platform drone systems. In drone forensics, there 
is a wealth of valuable information available from analysis of 
the associated mobile platform used to control the UAV. 
Flight logs and identifying artefacts can often be found within 
the data of the respective controlling application. Analysis of 
flight data reveals actions taken by the UAV and can be useful 
in re-constructing flights that took place, which is useful for 
crimes such as smuggling mentioned in Section 1. This 
requires correlation of data streams from the sensors available 
on the UAV. Media captured by the drone also contains useful 
information, especially when geotagged such as the case of the 
DJI Phantom 3 Professional. The content of the media itself is 
also pivotal information when investigating crimes such as 
invasion of privacy. The forensic analysis of drones requires a 
polymathic style of work - simultaneously being able to adapt 
to the many embedded and mobile environments that may be 
encountered. Future work should focus on other mobile 
platforms not covered in the scope of this paper, including iOS 
and Windows Phone. Other popular drone platforms should 
also be analysed. The methods discussed in this paper can be 
integrated into commercial forensics toolkits to develop 
support for drone systems. This would highly benefit the 
digital forensics community in the emerging area of drone 
forensics. 
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